upon the surface of the situation and do not go deeply enough to uncover the basic assumptions underlying the developments described above. The main focus of my argument is on the Dutch approach to new migrants of (perceived) Islamic backgrounds as opposed to other categories of "migrants" who came to the Netherlands in the earlier decades, such as the Indo-Dutch and Surinamese.
The assumption underlying the reactions portrayed above is that Dutch society belongs to the native Dutch and that they have the right to feel discomfort about the growing "threat" caused by certain groups of migrants. A quite telling example is the statement of Prime Minister Mark Rutte in March 2011, after the results of the state elections, when he said, "We will make sure, ladies and gentlemen, that we give this beautiful country back to the Dutch, because this is our project."
2 Also, most of the studies on migrants presented in the media support this assumption. Take, for example, the same newspaper that reported the election results of PVV as its cover story juxtaposed with a story on "schrikbarende misdaadcijfers" (shocking crime statistics) based on data presented by professor of criminology Frank Bovenkerk.
His data show that 55 percent of Moroccan-Dutch men in Rotterdam between 18 and 24 have had contact with the police at least once. He goes on to report that the chance of a repeat offence is 90 percent (van Been 4). 3 The recent discussions on integration in the Netherlands are informed by feelings of discomfort and fear of the growing influence of migrants from Islamic countries on society.
In addition, we see increasing insistence that migrants distance themselves from "backward" elements of their own culture, which are assumed to be in contrast with Dutch culture. This is particularly true regarding gender equality and space for homosexuality. Public discussion implies that this distance will lead to cultural adaptation to Dutch society. Every reaction that acknowledges the insecure feelings of the "native Dutch" justifies the critique of migrant culture as well. Here we can observe a clear double standard: It is OK for the "native Dutch" to feel defensive and to protect their culture, but migrants are criticized for defending theirs. Migrants are seen as the ones who need to adopt or even assimilate into the new culture. Not many people would consider this asymmetric approach racist, since it is believed that the discussion is about culture and not about race (see also Schinkel on this) . This begs the question of why the discussion of the culture of migrants focuses on how it needs to change, yet discussion of the culture of the "native Dutch" recognizes the reasons for a defensive attitude. This double standard has two dimensions. One, it is founded in a deeply rooted notion of the superiority of cultures. Although this idea of superi- proposed that Dutch culture was better because of its equality and openness, as opposed to Islamic culture, which is defined as oppressive and violent. In other publications, I have elaborated specifically on gender related notions of this homogenized presentation of cultures (Ghorashi, "From Absolute") . Second, it is taken for granted that the natives of the country have the right to claim their culture, because they were here first, while the newcomers have to change their culture and assimilate into a new one. Verena Stolcke has referred to this culturist presence as "cultural fundamentalism," a term that she explains as a new form of exclusion rhetoric in the West based on a homogeneous, static, coherent, and rooted notion of culture. This time, it is not the race that needs to be protected, but the assumed historically rooted homogeneity of the nation: "racism without race" (Stolcke) . In addition, a broader definition of racism (such as that of Philomena Essed, "Everyday Racism") could also provide a framework to grasp this new exclusionary rhetoric. No matter which choice is made, it seems that any reference to racism in the Dutch context elicits either an exaggerated and dismissive reaction in the public arena or complete silence. 4 Fear or Outrage?
The spread of exclusionary rhetoric about migrants is often explained as fear of change attributed to growing diversity and insecurity in a global world believed to be heading towards a "clash of civilizations." I have followed this line of argumentation in my earlier work, as well (Ghorashi, Paradoxen) Why is racism so adamantly denied in the Netherlands? To find an answer to this question, we need a different line of reasoning.
Paradoxically, it was the logic of one of the rightist opinion leaders appearing in a television interview that brought me closer to answering this question. He explained Thamyris/Intersecting No. 27 (2014) 101-116 that people like him are not afraid of the migrants, but outraged. The pundit claimed that the Dutch had done their best for different groups of migrants and had made efforts to accept them into society but that those efforts had been met with ingratitude by migrants who had taken advantage of Dutch hospitality. This illuminates the quote at the beginning of this paper in which one of the supporters of Wilders mentions that he has "had enough." The oft-heard voice in rightist discourse is that there will be no more special treatment for migrants. Migrants, they tell us, will no longer be coddled (referring to the word knuffelen in Dutch), as they supposedly had been in the 1980s. They see migrants as ungrateful of the tolerance and openness of Dutch In this paper, I analyze this line of argumentation in two different ways. First, I
counter the assumption that migrants were coddled during the 1980s and that society has already done enough for them. Second, I analyze the grounds for the assumption that migrants should be grateful for all of the things they have received from Dutch society. By doing so, I will show that the whole notion of hospitality and coddling is connected to a categorical approach to migrants in which they have always been considered deviant from the Dutch norm and in need of special attention because of their inherent shortcomings. This approach presumes that Dutch society is a generous patron of poor, needy migrants.
In the following sections, I begin with a short description of Dutch history on migration issues. By doing so, I show that the claim of openness, generosity and tolerance toward migrants is situated within this specific history. After that, I use the work of scholars such as Harrel-Bond to explore the relationship between gift and gratitude.
I end by connecting these elements in order to explain why the term racism, and scholars on critical studies of racism, have rarely been given a voice in the Netherlands. At the end of the 1980s, this minority policy came under severe pressure. More attention had to be given to integration, with less attention to cultural background.
This criticism formed the foundation of the report on allochthonous (non-native Dutch citizens) policy, in which the WRR (Dutch Council on Governmental Policy) advised the government in 1989 to put more emphasis on integration. In 1994, again advised by the WRR, the minority policy was replaced with an integration policy. In the report, allochthonous were again defined as "problem categories." On top of that, the focus shifted from groups that shared the same cultural background ("ethnic minorities") to individual representatives of the super category: "non-native" ("allochthonous").
The contradiction here is that the term allochthonous is not connected to any particular cultural background and hence individualizes, while categorizing at the same time. In the 1990s, the concepts of naturalization and integration were on everyone's lips, replacing the (partially) accepted notion of "preservation of own cultural background" in the two preceding decades. In 1998, the Law on the Naturalization of Newcomers came into effect. The focus on naturalization was instigated by the relatively new idea that migrants were here to stay. The mandatory character of this new law, however, gave rise to criticism, because it harkened back to forced assimilation (Entzinger) .
Policymakers discussed and decided; papers and terminology were changed, yet the essence remained the same: whether people were labelled as guest workers, migrants, minorities, or allochtonous, they were, and remained, problem categories with a deviant culture. When looking at these developments around the issue of migration, we can conclude that categorical thinking, with its powerful socio-cultural and socio-economic components, has remained a crucial feature of thinking on migrant issues in the Netherlands. This means that the various policy shifts have never called into question or exposed the basic assumptions (that is, the sociocultural and socio-economic non-conformity of migrants) underlying these policies. Thamyris/Intersecting No. 27 (2014) 101-116 "Allochtonization," Pillarization, and the Welfare State
In order to understand the present "allochtonization"-or culturalization-as a dominant discourse in Dutch society, it needs to be situated in the context of two historical phenomena: pillarization and the welfare state.
The construction of pillars-"own worlds"-along lines of religious denominations and political ideologies has long been the dominant framework for dealing with differences in the Netherlands. Studies about the pillar system are so diverse that it is impossible to include an all-encompassing overview of them in this paper. Still, a short outline is necessary for my further argumentation. Political scientist Pennings calls pillars "separated institutional complexes of religiously or ideologically motivated institutions and members, which are marked along the same boundaries in different social sectors" (21). He describes pillarization as "the process in which after 1880 Catholics, orthodox Protestants and social democrats have gradually institutionalized their mutual differences" (21). Despite the variation within the pillars, the "own worlds" concept persuaded the members that the boundaries of the pillars were clear. In addition, most social activities were organized within individual pillars.
This dichotomy between "us" and "them" stems from an essentialist approach toward one's own group and that of others, something which has latently shaped the way in which new migrants have been approached in the Netherlands.
It is very likely that the habitus of pillarization continued when the new migrants came to the Netherlands, which contributed to the assumption that their cultures were entirely different from that of the Dutch. Sociologist Koopmans holds that the relationship between Dutch society and its migrants is strongly rooted in the pillarized tradition. The pillarized system, which in the early twentieth century was a successful pacifying element in the conflicts between local religious and political groups, has been reintroduced as an instrument of integration (Koopmans 166, 167) . The influence of this pillarized history on migrants is most clearly witnessed in migrants from Islamic countries. Policymakers and academics considered this group to be a new kind of pillar. Here we encounter contrary processes: after the welfare state had made pillars redundant by taking on roles once held by the community, a new discourse started to grow about the creation of a new pillar in the relatively de-pillarized Netherlands. Logically it seems misplaced to think of a new pillar in a country that has struggled to prove that it is a de-pillarized society in which the emphasis is on individual autonomy against pressure by a group. In actuality, however, the influence of pillarization did not suddenly disappear due to the realization that it was no longer necessary: the effects of pillarization on various social fields continued, albeit in a less explicit form. Thus, the forms and patterns of pillarization were present and could enable, or even stimulate, the development of a new pillar. Yet, the field of tension sketched earlier shows the confusing situation that recent migrants from Islamic background faced. The habitus of pillarization translated into minority thinking. It left-and even created-space for these migrants to preserve their own culture, especially when it was still generally assumed that they would return to their home countries. At the same time, this space for group formation on a cultural or religious basis formed a foundation of uneasiness and discomfort for the Dutch majority population. At a time when the majority was believed to be freed from the limitations and pressures of the group, there is a new group in the society which claims its rights: a group believed to be traditional in many ways. The increasing aversion to the existence of this new pillar (with predominantly traditional ideas) focused on the suppression of the individual freedom of members of the group.
Thinking in terms of pillars affects more than Islamic migrants alone. To a certain extent, it has demarcated thinking about cultural differences and ethnic boundaries.
This has led to the increase of cultural contrasts that make it virtually impossible to consider the individual migrant as separate from his or her cultural or ethnic category. Categories are indispensable for providing an insight into the world, but as soon as these categories change into dichotomies, they have a limiting effect.
Constructing and dealing with differences vis-à-vis migrants has been done in various ways throughout history. Consistently, however, migrants-even those with a nonIslamic background-have been considered a deviation from the Dutch standard. This demonstrated that the obstinacy of the pillarized habitus has both shaped and preserved the culturalization component of categorical thinking.
Another development, which informed the deficit-component of categorical thinking, was the rise of the welfare state. The basis of this development was an increasing tendency toward the principle of equality, resulting in discontent about existing inequality. In its early stage, this dissatisfaction regarding the "unsociables" 8 went hand in hand with a tendency to isolate these groups in order to restyle them into decent citizens (Lucassen) . As a result, all citizens were entitled to equal opportunities, but in some cases it was more important to first liberate them from their socially disadvantaged position. It had become the essence of the welfare state to worry about disadvantaged groups and to see to it that their disadvantaged positions were eliminated. This need caused an increase in the number of welfare organizations in the Netherlands. Apart from that, the rise of the welfare state in the Netherlands reduced the need for individuals to become part of a group in order to survive. This resulted in more space for the individual to develop and demand autonomy.
Simultaneously, these developments contributed to the creation of governmentdependent categories of people that needed to be helped out of a disadvantaged position. The regulating effect of striving for equality has been a growing uneasiness toward those who are considered social deficits or as a kind of lower class, as well as a fixation on reshaping this disadvantaged category (Lucassen) . The oftenunintended result is that even active and capable people are easily reduced to helpless creatures. 9 Moreover, striving for equality can, at times, quickly change into uneasiness, not only about inequality but also about difference. That which is different is looked upon with distrust and is sometimes too easily placed into the "disadvantaged" category. Despite the positive effect of the welfare state on personal space and the struggle against the social divide, it has also been an important breeding ground for categorical thinking about migrants as groups that are in a socially disadvantaged position.
Clearly, this combination of deficit-thinking-stimulated by the welfare state-and the tendency toward culturalization-fuelled by the history of pillarization-have been persistent factors of categorical thinking in the Netherlands. Even if the cultural background of migrants was seen as positive in the 1980s, thinking about that background remained categorical because migrant cultures were primarily considered as something completely different, or as deviating from the standard. The paradox here, though, is that the rise of anti-migrant hostility at this moment coincides with the dismantling of the welfare state, and the rising insecurity brought about by neo-liberalist reforms.
So What Has Changed?
In the era that is now commonly called the "post-Fortuyn" period, we have seen new modes of categorical thinking arise. We see, for instance, that the emphasis on the negative consequences of cultural contrasts or culturalization has gained much greater prominence and is now much in evidence in the "Islamization" of the dis- feelings with respect to migrants could finally be expressed in public. In the following section, I will elaborate on the differences between the soft and hard approaches.
The Building Blocks of the Soft Approach
Since the 1970s, categorical thinking combined with an essentialist approach to culture has become characteristic of public discourse in the Netherlands. Until the new realist discourse began dominating public space, migrants were seen as groups with a completely different culture who needed to be tolerated. The main objective of the resigned regime of tolerance was pacification. The idea was to accept the fact that the other is different, but to refrain from establishing an intrinsic connection. This type of tolerance was typical of the era of pillarization. The pillars tolerated the existence of one another, but in general did not look for interaction. During pillarization, respect for the "walls" between the pillars had become more important than respect for the content of the pillars (Ghorashi, Ways to Survive) . This form of tolerance was also applied to the so-called new Islamic pillar. People who were believed to belong to this pillar were tolerated out of custom because earlier cases had shown that this attitude would result in pacification. However, what had been successful during pillarization would not work for this new group of migrants. The problem revolved around their connection to Dutch identity, which had not been a point of discussion during the time of pillarization, but which would have to be created for the new Dutch.
Tolerance without involvement and interaction could not create enough opportunities for the new migrants to establish an emotional interaction with Dutch identity, and therefore, social pacification.
Simultaneously, a different sort of tolerance was present during this period, which was based on a simplified definition of cultural-relativism. The other culture was different by definition, but all cultures were equal in principle. Departing from this idea, everything the other said or did was accepted because it was different, whereas all deviating behavior was explained as originating from this cultural otherness. At first, this approach may seem to have been a positive one, but its most noteworthy characteristics appear to be indifference and passivity. This type of multiculturalism, defined by McLaren as leftist-liberal multiculturalism, defines otherness as essential and as something interesting and exotic. 10 In that sense, this approach is an essentialist one as well, and can be defined as categorical thinking. As a result, "allochthonous" people are often extolled in practice, mainly because they are allochthonous.
If migrants are largely seen as completely different, this does not result in an increasing trans-ethnic involvement and interaction, but rather in a blind spot toward the manifold possibilities and talents of migrants.
Categorical thinking (incorporating the essentialist approach toward migrant culture and the belief in their disadvantaged position) in the era of the so-called soft approach has resulted in a lack of discussion surrounding the basic assumptions concerning the role and position of migrants in Dutch society. This implies that migrants have never been approached and treated as full members of society. It has resulted in both an increase in negative feelings regarding migrants and in a weak or even non-existent emotional connection between migrants and Dutch society. This source of uneasiness and mutual misunderstanding has been a powerful breeding ground for the rise of today's hard approach. Despite strong criticism in the past with respect to integration, the origin of "hyperrealism" is to be situated historically within the era of so-called political correctness.
Both the hard and soft approach are rooted in terms of cultural contrasts and in the conviction that migrants have shortcomings that they need to overcome. There have been shifts in tone (from soft to harsh), in focus (from socio-economic to sociocultural), and in outlook (from optimistic to pessimistic). These shifts, however, have soning, they will not accept being called racist because they consider themselves to be people who are of good will and intention. Dutch society has an international reputation for being generous in charity based on its available budget for development issues. They also believe themselves to have been charitable toward migrants, since it is their tax money that has been used to support the dependent groups in the society, which are mainly considered to be migrants. However, various studies show that over-subsidizing has a way of making people dependent where they could have been entrepreneurial and responsible for their own lives (Harrell-Bond, Ghorashi "Refugees"). Yet, this does not impact the assumptions informing the Dutch feeling of outrage when all "their" charitable efforts toward migrants remain not only unanswered in the form of gratitude, but answered in the form of growing assertiveness and violence. The only thing happening now is that they (the Dutch majority) are not taking it anymore. Thus, the framework through which discriminatory acts toward migrants are justified is not defined as racist but as a natural attitude of defence.
Using the term "racism" is then seen as a weapon that is used by those ungrateful, spoiled migrants and their supporters to silence their opponents.
Through this analysis I have tried to show that the categorical foundation of the discourse toward migrants in the 1980s-even that with a positive connotationwas the breeding ground for the growing negative discourse toward migrants. The culturalist approach of viewing migrants as being absolutely other in society, combined with the deficit approach of seeing migrants as dependents of the welfare state, has served as a strong foundation. In the 1980s, migrants were tolerated as absolute others because they were not seen as a threat to the state and were not assertive enough to claim equal citizenship. When the culture and religion of migrants transitioned from being viewed as not only different but also dangerous after 2001, we observe how thin the boundary has been between the charity-like positive approach and the protective negative approach toward the same migrants now. This explains why so many well-intentioned and highly educated Dutch citizens have chosen to blame migrants themselves for the dominant negative discourse in the society. The fact remains, that both in the times of positive and negative rhetoric, new Dutch citizens have always been considered absolute others in the society, to be tolerated as long as they do not pose a threat, in which case they are threatened with expulsion.
What remains consistent is that migrants are responsible for the positions taken by the dominant majority. The irony here is that migrants are considered (fully) responsible for the actions of the majority, yet are not considered full participants in Dutch society. It is this justification process rooted in the historical past which allows the majority to shirk responsibility for their actions and refuse to acknowledge their exclusionary rhetoric as racist. This is exactly how majorities end up being right all the time; in addition to having numbers in their favor, they also have the means and access to the public space to provide, reinforce, and dominate the image of the other which suits them the most.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown the main reason for the allergy toward the concept of racism in the Netherlands. I started by showing the historical rootedness of the present harshness toward migrants. To do that, I focused on the categorical approach to migration in the 1980s as the foundation for the present Islamization of the discourse. In addition, I showed that the idea of the superiority of Dutch culture is linked to the notion of helping the needy and its connection to the idea of gratefulness.
I argued that this specific attitude toward charity is connected to the basic assumptions of a welfare state and so seems to fit quite well within the thinking that categorizes migrants as people in need. The conclusion of my paper is that there is not a disruption but rather a connection between the present hard and negative rhetoric Thamyris/Intersecting No. 27 (2014) [101] [102] [103] [104] [105] [106] [107] [108] [109] [110] [111] [112] [113] [114] [115] [116] and that of previous decades. The source of the connection is in the manner through which culture has served as an absolute category of otherness. In addition, categorical thinking within the context of the welfare state provides the foundation for the Dutch image as charitable and open: an image that justifies the present outrage against migrants as being so ungrateful. It is this process of justification linked to the self-image of the Dutch which makes it almost impossible to accept the notion of racism as part of their image. This resistance will stay intact as long as this historically rooted categorical grounding is not challenged. As long as the superiority of Dutch culture is unquestioned and unexamined as the foundation of the dominant discourse concerning migrants-even those who are second and third generation and have Dutch nationality-there can be no space to acknowledge racism in the Netherlands. Without that, the society is not able to prepare itself for the consequences of growing racism. Even more problematic in the long run is that, as long as there is no acknowledgement of racism in the Netherlands, there can be no strong movement against racism.
